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Downloading Personhood: A Hegelian Theory
of Copyright Law
Karla M. O’Regan*
I’m sorry; when I worked 9 to 5, I expected to get a fucking paycheck every
week. It’s the same with music; if I’m putting my fucking heart and all my
time into music, I expect to get rewarded for that. I work hard and anybody
can just throw a computer up and download my shit for free. That Napster
shit, if that gets any bigger, it could kill the whole purpose of making music.
It’s not just about the money. . . . It’s the thrill of going to the store; you
can’t wait till that artist’s release date, taking the wrapper off the CD and
putting the CD in to see what it sounds like. I’ve seen those little sissies on
TV, talking about [how] ‘The working people should just get music for
free,’ I’ve been a working person. I never could afford a computer, but I
always bought and supported the artists that I liked. I always bought a
Tupac CD, a Biggie CD, a Jay-Z CD. If you can afford a computer, you can
afford to pay $16 for my CD.1
Eminem, recording artist.
Earlier this year, MP3 outpaced “sex” as the No.1 search term on the Web.2
INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2008, Bill C-61 was given its first reading in Canada’s House of
Commons. This Bill, an Act to Amend the existing Copyright Act, listed five aims
of the new legislation, the first of which sought to “update the rights and protec-
tions of copyright owners to better address the Internet, in line with international
* Assistant Professor of Criminology at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, N.B. The
author thanks her former professors, Peter Benson and Abraham Drassinower, whose
works and teachings inspired her many years ago to think about Hegel and intellectual
property with an unbridled curiosity and sense of possibility.
1 RIAA, “Music Online: The Future is Now” Wall of Sound (17 May 2000), online:
MusicUnited.org <http://www.musicunited.org/3_artists.html>.
2 Jennifer Sullivan and Christopher Jones, “More Popular than Sex” Wired Magazine (14
October 1999), online: <http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/1999/10/31834>.
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standards.”3 The Bill has come under significant criticism since its first reading,4
bringing to the fore a number of significant tensions and competing interests the
Internet and its technological era have brought to the realm of copyright law. These
debates are hardly new, having received the widest audience almost a decade ago
when during his second term at Northeastern University, a nineteen-year-old com-
puter science student designed a file-storage system5 that changed the world of in-
tellectual property.6This system, which was later coined “Napster” after designer
Fanning’s “unruly” hair,7 served to revolutionize the music industry and its rela-
tionship with technology. By creating a system that allowed Internet users to share
MP3’s (a highly compressed, near-CD quality electronic music file)8 from their
3 Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 2d session, 39th Parliament, 56-57
Elizabeth II, 2007-2008.
4 See Peter Nowak, “Copyright Law Could Result in Police State: Critics”, CBC News
(12 June 2008) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/technology/
story/2008/06/12/tech-copyright.html>. See also Michael Geist, “Troubling Details in
New Downloading Law” The Toronto Star (13 June 2008) online: The Star
<http://www.thestar.com/article/442677>.
5 Ariel Berschadsky, “RIAA v. Napster: A Window onto the Future of Copyright Law in
the Internet Age” (2000) 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 755 at 759-760.
6 Throughout this article, the term “intellectual property” is used, and while the discus-
sion herein deals primarily with copyright applications, it is not meant to be exclusive
to aspects of trademark or patent law. This view is guided by the distinction between
“practical” and “general” analyses of intellectual property law made by Kenneth L.
Port in his Foreword to the “Symposium on Intellectual Property Theory” (1993) 68
Chicago-Kent L.Rev. 585 at 586:
In defining “intellectual property” as a term of art, there are two levels
of analysis. The first is the practical, specific level whereby intellec-
tual property is made up of three primary subfields — namely, patents,
copyrights, and trademarks. On this level, it is fundamental to recog-
nize that patents, copyrights, and trademarks are not interchangeable.
. . .
On another more generalized level, intellectual property is the legal regime
by which authors or inventors protect their intellectual creations. On this
level, distinguishing with any particularity the conceptual differences be-
tween the subfields may not be necessary because each begins with the
same inquiry — who owns the creation and what is the scope of those own-
ership rights.
7 Port, ibid. at n. 14.
8 “MP3” is an abbreviation of the term “MPEG-1 layer-3”, derived from the acronym
“MPEG” for the Moving Pictures Expert Group, “a working group formed under the
joint direction of the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International
Electro-Technical Commission (IEC) [which] works to develop ‘international stan-
dards for compression, decompression, processing, and coded representation of moving
pictures, audio and their combination.’” Jocelyn Dabeau, “An Introduction to MP3”,
online: William Fisher Homepage <http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
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 home computers via the Internet,9 “Napster . . . almost single-handedly dragged
the music industry into the Internet age.”10
Fearing the impact Napster and copy-cat systems would have on record sales
and music distribution control, the industry was less than enthusiastic about Fan-
ning’s program or its implications.11 This was a fear that later turned out to be well
placed, with Napster claiming to have had over seventy million users at its peak,
located in thirteen countries.12 Similarly, reports from the Recording Industry As-
sociation of America (RIAA) in 2000 indicated a dramatic decrease of sales of
compact disc singles, (a direct competitor with MP3 music files).13 The music in-
dustry fought back by filing suit against Napster on behalf of eighteen separate
record companies, alleging “contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.”14
Ultimately, after a District Court hearing and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Napster was enjoined from resuming its online file-sharing service.15 Yet, in
tfisher/music/MP3.html>; “MP3” is the acronym for “Moving Pictures Experts Group
1, Audio Layer 3.” See Berschadsky, supra note 5 at 758-9, n. 9.
9 While Napster served as the central database, “hosting” users’ music files, none of
these files were actually stored with Napster, allowing the owners of Napster to later
claim ignorance to copyright infringements of its users. See Berchandsky, supra note 5
at 759-60; See also Glasebrook, infra note 10 at 822-23.
10 Sarah D. Glasebrook, “‘Sharing’s Only Fun When It’s Not Your Stuff’: Napster.com
Pushes the Envelope of Indirect Copyright Infringement” (2001) 69 UMKC L.Rev. 811
at n. 7, citing Clay Shirky, FEED Magazine.
11 This also extended to recording artists and songwriters who expressed concern that
Napster and like systems would effectively steal their profits or the necessary incentive
for future artists. See Mike Stoller, “Songs That Won’t Be Written” The New York
Times (7 October 2000), online: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9903E1DD153CF934A35753C1A9669C8B63&n
=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/F/Finances>.
12 Grace J. Bergen, “The Napster Case: The Whole World is Listening” (2002) 15
Transnat’l Law. 259 at 260-261.
13 John Borland, “Music Industry Blames Net for Some Revenue Woes” CNET (16 Feb-
ruary 2001), online: CNET <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4852756.html>,
cited in Aric Jacover, “I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to
Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications” (2002) 90 Ge-
orgetown L.J. 2207 at 2210, n. 12. Worth noting, is Napster’s claim (during litigation)
that its system didn’t take away record sales, but would rather increase revenue as users
of the application would “sample” music before purchasing it. See A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, C.A. 9 (Cal.), 2001 at 1017, cited in Jacover, supra
note 13 at 2210.
14 Timothy J. Ryan, “Infringement.Com: RIAA v. Napster and the War Against Online
Music Piracy” (2002) 44:2 Arizona Law Review 495.
15 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, C.A.9 (Cal.), 2002 at 1098
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the wake of its demise, numerous alternate peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies sprung
up,16 (the so-called “Sons of Napster”)17 sparking a series of legal actions.18
The “Napster” case, much like Parliament’s recent Bill C-61, served as a cli-
max for mounting apprehensions and speculations about both the efficiency and
feasibility of copyright law to cope with the latest developments of the information
age. Similarly, it has prompted many intellectual property theorists to reconsider
the impact of a number of technological advancements on traditional principles of
intellectual property, copyright in particular.19 The need for such musings does not
seem misplaced given that studies have shown P2P usage has increased following
the Napster decision,20 a staggering notion given that Napster alone, at its peak,
was reported to have “had over eighty million registered users who downloaded as
many as three billion songs per month.”21 Similarly, P2P usage has been found to
reduce the probability of music purchases by thirty per cent.22 There have been
16 Following the Nine Circuit’s ruling in A&M Records, supra note 13, other P2P applica-
tions emerged using a “decentralized” model of peer-to-peer networking, rather than
Napster’s “centralized” model. Timothy J. Ryan, in his article, “Infringement.Com:
RIAA v. Napster and the war against online music piracy”, supra note 14 at 517, notes
that over 70 different versions of file sharing systems were available following the
Napster ruling. A perusal of the site “After Napster: The Beat Goes On”, online:
Freshnoise <http://www.afternapster.com>, reveals more than 100 possible file sharing
client software programs. For a more complete description of peer-to-peer technology,
see Jacover, supra note 11 at 2212–2218.
17 Sudip Bhattacharjee, et al., “Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activ-
ity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions” (2006) 49 Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics at 92.
18 The RIAA alone launched almost 800 lawsuits against alleged music sharers in the
months following the Napster case. See Bhattacharjee et al., ibid.
19 Although the “Napster” case was an American copyright case, the inter-dependent rela-
tionship between Canadian and U.S. copyright laws and litigation has often been noted:
see Sheldon Burshtein “Surfing the Internet: Copyright Issues in Canada” (1997) 13
Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 385. Similarly, the global effects of the Nap-
ster case have also been frequently commented on, suggesting that an examination of
the case within a Canadian copyright context is not uncalled for.
20 See Fara Tabatabai, “A Tale of Two Countries: Canada’s Response to the Peer-to-Peer
Crisis and What It Means for the United States” (2005) 73 Fordham L.Rev. 2321 at
2322. It is noted that the P2P network Kazaa had a reported 7000 users at the time of a
series of FBI (and arguably RIAA law suit-inspired) “raids.” Less than a year following
the raids, Kazaa’s user numbers increased to over twenty-two million in the U.S. alone
(with more than three times that number of users worldwide).
21 Timothy J. Ryan, “Infringement.com: RIAA v. Napster and the War Against Online
Music Piracy” (2002) 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 495 at 520, citing Jefferson Graham, “A
slimmed-down Napster Gets Back Online; Trial-Run is Heavy on Little Known Art-
ists” USA Today (10 January 2002) D1.
22 See Alejandro Zentner, “Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music Purchases”
(2006) 49 Journal of Law and Economics 63; “Thanks, me hearties” The Economist
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 multiple responses to this “crisis”, some as radical as to suggest the complete inap-
plicability and/or overhaul of traditional copyright theory to the world of informa-
tion technology.23 This article will examine these responses, identifying the com-
peting interests at work in both traditional copyright schemes and contemporary
Internet-based criticisms, and put forth a theory of copyright law capable of ad-
dressing the needs of these rival interests in an advanced technological era.
Part I delineates some of the more prominent theories copyright scholars have
offered in response to the “IP-IT crisis.”24Part II attempts to identify the source of
these problems by first examining conventional justifications for copyright and the
competing interests inherently at work in its conception. Part III identifies three
specific factors I argue are particularly problematic (both in terms of cause and
consequence) to the current state of the Internet and copyright theory. These are: (i)
the emergence of a corporate intermediary; (ii) the “death” of the author; and (iii) a
non-consideration of the copier. I examine each of these factors, suggesting their
problematic aspects are the result of an over-emphasis on instrumentalist values in
copyright theory. Part IV incorporates the work of Margaret Jane Radin on property
as personhood and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of abstract right in order to address these
three areas of concern and propose a “revised” theory of copyright law based on the
rights of the would-be-copier. Some concluding remarks on the implementation of
the theory are explored in Part V.
 387 (19 July 2008), an article published in July of 2008 in the Economist reported that
“global sales of recorded music fell by eight per cent in 2007, according to figures
released in June by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, a trade
group. It blamed 70 per cent of the decline on ‘file-sharing’ software.”
23 Perhaps, foremost in this advocacy has been John Perry Barlow, former lyricist for the
Grateful Dead, and current co-founder and Vice-Chair of the “Electronic Frontier
Foundation.” See, “The Economy of Ideas” Wired (March 1994) 84–90, 126–29, ar-
guably his most influential article on the subject of copyright and the Internet. See also,
John Perry Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas — Selling Wine Without Bottles on the
Global Net” Electronic Frontier Foundation, online: Electronic Frontier Foundation
<http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html> [Barlow, “Selling Wine With-
out Bottles on the Global Net”].
24 Although noted by many, the strongest statement of the current difficulties facing cop-
yright law in the Internet age is offered by Barlow, by way of analogy to a “sinking
ship”:
Since we don’t have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind of
challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping digitization
of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing into the future on
a sinking ship. This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright law
and patent law, was developed to convey forms and methods of ex-
pression entirely different from the vaporous cargo it is now being
asked to carry. It is leaking as much from within as without. (Barlow,
“Selling Wine Without Bottles on the Global Net”, supra note 23 at 1).
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I.  THE BABY AND THE BATHWATER: RESPONSES TO THE
“IP-IT” CRISIS
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I
ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You
have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address
you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always
speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally in-
dependent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have
true reason to fear. . . .
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more
humane and fair than the world your governments have made before.25
Many authors have referred to the Internet as the “Wild West” frontier of the
modern day.26 With its seemingly limitless possibilities and unexplored mediums,
it poses significant challenges to traditional modes of legal regulation and protec-
tion. Both the uniqueness of the forum as well as the ever-increasing influence of
cyberspace on daily life suggest an impending need for the law to respond in some
fashion. As noted by Lucinda Jones, the difficulty copyright has had in responding
to these new tasks is the consequence of two factors, “speed and scale.”27 Internet
usage rates have increased exponentially in the last decade. The most recent in-
ternet usage data suggests over one billion users worldwide, with over twenty per
cent of the total world population logging on.28 This figure is far beyond 1999
estimates of 150-200 million users and 2005 predictions of 300 million users.29 In
25 John Perry Barlow, “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic
Frontier Foundation, online: Electronic Frontier Foundation
<http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html>.
26 See: Shamoil Shipchandler, “The Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to the
Regulatory Question” (2000) 33 Cornell Int’l L. J. 435; Burshtein, supra note 19.
27 Lucinda Jones, “An Artist’s Entry into Cyberspace: Intellectual Property on the In-
ternet” (2000) 22 E.I.P.R. 79 at 79.
28 Miniwatts Marketing Group, Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture,
(2008), online: Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>.
(Last accessed August 17, 2008). See also David Crystal, “Interpreting Interlanguage”
1 e magazine: the A-Level English Magazine 27-28 (1998), where he notes: “in the five
minutes it might take you to read this article, 3000 new Internet users have logged on
somewhere in the world.” In a 2006 survey commissioned by the CRTC, it was found
that 70 per cent of Canadian households had internet access. See, Government of Can-
ada, Reforming the Copyright Act Backgrounder, online: Industry Canada
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/crp-prda.nsf/en/h_rp01151e.html>.
29 Jones, supra note 27 at 80, n. 10. Jones also notes that, “[t]he eGlobal Report
(http://www.cipo.gc.ca) reported that there were 130.6 million active users in 1999,
Time Magazine (June 22, 1999) reported a figure of 147 million users, and Nua In-
ternet Surveys (http://www.nua.ie) reported a figure of 171 million as at May 1999.”
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the face of such rapid change, it seems imperative that copyright law begin to ad-
dress the issues at stake in cyberspace.
We find ourselves living in an information-fuelled society, an economy
largely based on intangibles and knowledge, in which the basis of our rela-
tionships and the commodities of our trade are forms of intellectual pro-
perty — and the source of wealth is increasingly intellectual, as opposed to
physical, capital. The worth of Internet stocks, based largely on novel ideas
and intangibles, provides evidence of the value that society is placing on
this medium, as well as its insubstantiality.30
The responses to the challenges created by this new information era have been
both vast and various. While some scholars cling to the traditional principles of
copyright,31 others advocate for a complete abandonment of intellectual property
law within the electronic realm.32 Though not meant to be an exhaustive survey,
some of these theories and their primary arguments are summarised below.
(a) The Law as a Square Peg
A fair number of commentators have suggested that the law simply doesn’t
“fit” into the cyber world. This response is primarily found among theorists who
claim the relationship between law and technology is plagued by two problems:
speed and form. As noted by Henning Wiese, “the law, which is by its very nature a
carefully applied and reactionary tool to regulate occurring social justices in a con-
stant process, struggles to change in order to keep up with developments.”33 As
such, the law-making process is a slow one, and for some, in terms of information
technology, too slow:
Faith in law will not be an effective strategy for high tech companies. Law
adapts by continuous increments and at a pace second only to geology in its
stateliness. Technology advances in the lunging jerks, like the punctuation
of biological evolution grotesquely accelerated. Real world conditions will
continue to change at a blinding pace, and the law will get further behind,
more profoundly confused. This mismatch is permanent.34
Similarly, critics of intellectual property regimes within cyberspace suggest
that the form of digital media is beyond legal regulation. This approach, finding
root in post-modernist critiques of copyright, concentrates on the dichotomy be-
tween the legal realm of the tangible and the Internet’s world of “virtual reality.” It
is suggested the current IP-IT crisis “is a consequence of a true information society
30 Jones, supra note 27 at 79.
31 See M. de Zwart, “Copyright in Cyberspace” (1996) 21 Alternative L. J. 266.
32 Barlow, supra note 23.
33 Henning Wiese, “The Justification of the Copyright System in the Digital Age” (2002)
24 E.I.P.R. 387 at 387.
34 Barlow, supra note 23 at 6-7.
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where the information product and its mode of delivery are inseparable.”35 Within
this view, Napster was an ideal “information society” citizen, allowing “individuals
[to] share information and content directly, without central servers, company agen-
das or inconvenient copyright rules standing in the way.”36 This view has led some
commentators to suggest that the Internet and its evolution will only be encum-
bered by governmental regulation inept at keeping up with or applying to an elec-
tronic forum. As noted by Shipchandler:
The simplest, albeit most frightening, solution leaves the Internet unregu-
lated. While seemingly shocking and morally lax, non-regulation prevents
overbroad application of laws that will hinder the growth and development
of the Internet. Nations can scramble to tailor laws that will govern the In-
ternet, but the Internet’s infrastructure adapts to avoid such localized laws
quickly. The Internet’s global nature makes it impossible to control and im-
possible to damage; the Internet was designed to be immune to catastrophes
and invulnerable to shut down. Similarly, the Internet regulation may be
seen as an attack and, as such, will be circumvented. While nations try to
keep pace with this ever-changing technology, the world’s governments
may be doomed to haplessly chasing the Internet into the sunset.37
These recommendations have led both designers and scholars to create and advo-
cate for a system of “copyleft.”38 A concept attributed to Richard Stallman,
“copyleft” is “free software which permits a person to use, modify, and distribute
it. The source code is available to all users to run, copy, study how the program
works, distribute, change, modify and improve the software.”39 While seemingly a
“free-for-all” regime, copyleft has one rule: there are no rules. As stated by
Stallman:
[T]he central idea of copyleft is that we give everyone permission to run the
programs, copy the program, modify the program, to distribute modified
versions . . . but not permission to add certain restrictions of their own.
Thus, the crucial freedoms that define ‘free software’ are guaranteed to eve-
ryone who has a copy; they become inalienable rights.40
Other similarly radical solutions are offered by scholars and technological
practitioners alike, suggesting that the information highway is deserving of new
roadmaps. A theory known as “lex informatica” advocates for the reform and
35 Wiese, supra note 33 at 387.
36 J. Borland, et al., “The P2P Myth” CNET (26 October 2000), online: CNET
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-3248711-1.html>, cited by Wiese, supra note
33 at 387.
37 Shipchandler, supra note 26 at 463.
38 Paul Lambert, “Copyleft, Copyright and Software IPRs: Is Contract Still King?” (2001)
23 E.I.P.R. 165.
39 Ibid. at 167.
40 Cited in P. Lambert, supra note 38 at 167.
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 “recodeification” of internet-based copyright laws based on the opinions and rec-
ommendations of software engineers and technological developers.41
Despite these criticisms of law’s slow moving and archaic traditions, some
theorists have suggested these characteristics will prove fruitful for “IP-IT” rela-
tions. As noted by Sherman and Bently:
While much energy in this area of law is taken up with reform and
harmonisation and, as such, is constantly concerned with the future, there
are many reasons why time should be taken to consider the image of intel-
lectual property law that shapes and informs those discussions.42
In some cases, this period of contemplation is for the purposes of designing better,
more suitable means of securing and protecting information on the Internet. These
arguments are explored in further detail in the following section.
(b) Tech Solutions for Tech Problems
The answer to the machine is in the machine.43
A common response to allegations that the law is too slow to respond effi-
ciently to the demands of the digital era is a suggestion to invest time and money
into technological solutions. While the majority of these comments emerge from
technology developers and/or designers, some legal writers have begun to support
this line of thought, noting that “emerging copyright infringements are less of a
legal issue than a technological obstacle.”44
Solutions proposed include various forms of encryption,45 electronic signa-
tures,46 or the implementation of a form of digitized “watermark,” encoding the
protected information within the data of another piece of text, sound, or image.47
Other solutions are being pursued via various investigative task forces, such as the
41 See J.R. Reidenberg, “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology” (1998) 76 Texas L. Rev. 553.
42 Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The
British Experience, 1760-1911 (New York, NY: University Press, 1999) at 219-220,
cited in Wiese, supra note 33 at 393.
43 S. Dusollier, “Electrifying the Fence: The Legal Protection of Technological Measures
for Protecting Copyright” (1999) E.I.P.R. 285, cited in Wiese, supra note 33 at 394.
44 H. Harrington, “Is it the End of the Line for Copyright?” (2000) 38 Commercial Law-
yer 66 at 67.
45 Burshtein, supra note 19 at 391.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
10   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
RIAA’s Secure Digital Media Initiative, aimed at developing an industry standard
security system.48
Canada’s most recent foray into copyright protection, Bill C-61, proposes a
series of other “technological” solutions, providing consumers with the right to
copy “legally acquired music onto other devices such as MP3 players or
cellphones” or to make digital “backup” copies of (once again) legally acquired
creations (e.g. books, videos) using devices they own.49 This process, otherwise
known as “format shifting,” would include the creation of digital copies of music,
videos, photographs, etc., provided they meet a series of statutory requirements
(e.g. legal ownership and non-transgression of technological protections).
Interesting to note is the view among some commentators that these systems
will merely serve to protect copyrighted materials from those persons for whom
access to the information becomes too difficult. As Wiese notes:
As it stands, evasion is just too tempting. If, however, there are technologies
to make evasion more difficult and there are laws forbidding evasion, such a
combined protection system might prove useful and powerful, if only to
keep “honest people honest.”50
(c) Economic Proposals
While some analysts are advocating for increased security technologies or
reinvented rules for the management of intellectual property on the Internet, others
have suggested that enforcement of copyright law should play second fiddle to
profit-making.51 One of these recommendations is a “metering and royalty collec-
tion system,” which would involve the distribution of compulsory licenses for the
downloading of copyrighted material.52 This would allow Internet users to circum-
vent having to obtain permission requests from copyright holders for each piece of
material desired (a process that can be quite complicated given the various groups
and/or individuals who can hold copyright in one work).53 Compensation would be
provided to copyright holders by way of royalties from the use of the material.54
A similar strategy suggested, and currently employed with respect to blank
compact-discs, is a system of taxation, applied to various entities that derive finan-
48 Harrington, supra note 44 at 67. For more information on the SDMI, visit the RIAA
website, online: RIAA <http://www.riaa.org>.
49 Bill C-61, supra note 3 at s. 17.
50 Wiese, supra note 33 at 393 (also noteworthy is Wiese’s observation that the majority
of copyright infringements on the Internet are accounted for by these “occasional”
infringers).
51 Jacover, supra note 13; see also R. Anthony Reese, “Copyright and Internet Music
Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions” (2003) U.
Miami L. Rev. 237.
52 Jacover, supra note 13 at 2250–52.
53 See e.g. Henriquez’s discussion of copyright holders for works of music, infra note
122.
54 Jacover, supra note 13 at 2251.
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cial benefit from the use of copyrighted material on the Internet.55 Other proposals
include the use of “pay per listen” subscription services (already at work on some
sites)56 and the maximisation of web advertising revenue.57 Bill C-61 extends these
economic responses to the IP-IT crisis with a proposed fixed limit on statutory
damages for copyright infringement (i.e. $500), provided all infringements pertain
to the defendant’s private use and/or collection.58
Irrespective of the proposals being offered, contemplation of the nature and
justifications for copyright entitlements seems integral to any successful implemen-
tation or adaptation program. In light of this, the following section attempts to in-
vestigate some of the more prominent theories of copyright law, prior to identifying
particular problems raised by the application of copyright to the Internet, in Part III.
II. FRUITS OF THE MIND: JUSTIFICATION THEORIES OF
COPYRIGHT LAW
Now is my way clear, now is the meaning plain:
Temptation shall not come in this kind again.
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.
T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral59
Conflict is at the heart of copyright. This is evidenced even in the manner by
which commentators organize their reflections on its practice, theory, and chal-
lenges, i.e. “questioning the nature of an author’s claim [or] questioning the nature
of the copier.”60 In some instances, this has been attributed to the “right” that copy-
right seeks to recognize and protect, (i.e. exclusion), and the reason(s) presented for
doing so (i.e. access). As noted by Peter Jaszi:
Copyright is informed by a commonly perceived, seemingly basic contra-
diction of purpose. On the one hand, copyright aims to promote public dis-
closure and dissemination of works of “authorship”; on the other hand, it
seeks to confer on the creators the power to restrict or deny distribution of
their works.61
55 Ibid. at 2252-3.
56 Reese, supra note 51 at 237, n. 1.
57 Ibid. at 237.
58 Bill C-61, supra note 3 at s. 30(1). Also noteworthy is s. 30(2) that states a defendant
can plead ignorance as a means of reducing the $500 fine to an amount not less than
$200.
59 T. S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace, 1935) at part 1.
60 Port, supra note 6 at 585.
61 Peter Jaszi, “Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ‘Authorship’”
(1991) Duke L.J. 455 at 463.
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The origins of this view can be traced back to the Western Enlightenment period.62
As early as the eighteenth century, Anglo-American jurisprudence began to view
intellectual property as a means of managing a set of competing interests between
the owner and the user. This can be seen in the comments made by Lord Mansfield
in the case Sayre v. Moore63 where he observed the necessity to,
. . . guard against two extremes equally prejudicial: the one, that men of
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community,
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.64
Centuries later, courts have recognized “what is worth copying is prima facie worth
protecting,”65 while cautioning that “care must always be taken not to allow . . .
[patent and copyright laws] to be made instruments of oppression and extortion.”66
The need to account for copyright law likely stems from this paradoxical na-
ture. It is founded on the general rule that “the noblest of human productions —
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas — became, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.”67 Given this inherent
contradiction, it isn’t surprising that few copyright scholars agree on either its
moral or practical justification. Prior to examining the particular factors arising out
of the current Internet dilemma, some attention must be paid to the traditional theo-
ries of justification, in order to both identify the source(s) of the problems, as well
as contextualize the later discussion of theory.
Copyright theory can be generalized as having two independent camps, each
of which has grown out of a need to justify the exclusionary right granted to pro-
perty owners. These are justifications based on (i) instrumental value, and (ii) in-
trinsic value.68
62 David Vaver, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks (Con-
cord, ON: Irwin Law, 1997) at 10.
63 Sayre v. Moore (1785), 1 East. 361n, 102 E.R. 139 (Eng. K.B.).
64 Ibid. at 140.
65 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 (Eng.
Ch. Div.), at 610.
66 Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109 (Eng. C.A.), at 128 approved 100
years later in Canadian Assn. of Broadcasters v. Society of Composers, Authors &
Music Publishers of Canada (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 190 (Fed. C.A.), at 196, cited in
Vaver, supra note 62 at 11.
67 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (U.S., 1918), Brandeis J
dissenting at 250.
68 Although these categories are used frequently in the literature, this particular descrip-
tion was taken from Timothy J. Brennan, “Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny”
(1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 675 at 691.
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(a) Instrumental Value Theories
“The generally accepted principle of copyright law is to grant protection to
specific authors to encourage all authors to create and disseminate their works. As a
result, the public at large will have access to this information.”69 This argument is
based on the assumption that in the absence of this protection, creators of intellec-
tual works would be less willing and/or able to engage in this process of creation
and disclosure. This “incentive” principle is the foundation for instrumentalist justi-
fications of copyright in most of its forms, three of which are discussed herein.
(i) Economic Efficiency
This theory is largely attributed to Ronald Coase who contended that the crea-
tion and dissemination of property was attributable to the perceived efficiency of
market transactions.70 In this way, property rights served to increase this efficiency,
“by providing the excludability and alienability necessary for consensual transac-
tions.”71 This view was put forth in his now famed article, “The Problem of Social
Cost”, where Coase suggests that property rights should be justified on the basis of
their market worth, rather than some intrinsic value or relationship they might have
to or with the owner.72 Instead, property rights were better thought of as bargaining
tools with which persons were able to complete transactions in mutually beneficial
ways. Consequently, property rights are able to function as a form of incentive for
property improvements, sales, and purchases, increasing the overall efficiency and
quality of the market.73
The attraction of the Coase Theorem to instrumental theorists is easily under-
stood given the tendency among such theorists to justify individual rights of exclu-
sion by way of social utility and/or benefit.74 The prevalence of this principle in
Anglo-American jurisprudence can be found in many places, including the U.S.
Constitution, which includes the “promot[ion] [of] the progress of science and the
useful arts,” in its first article.75 Thomas Jefferson, a prominent figure in the devel-
69 Port, supra note 6 at 587.
70 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J.L. & Econ. 1.
71 Brennan, supra note 68 at 694.
72 Ibid. at 694. These types of intrinsic values and relationships are discussed in a later
section of the article.
73 Ibid. at 694.
74 While some authors have suggested that this is characteristic of intellectual property in
general, (See Jeremy Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 841 at 847–49.), I
would submit it is far more prominent in theories emphasising the social and/or “mar-
ket” values of intellectual property rights than those that argue the relationship between
creator and created establishes an inherent entitlement worthy of recognition. Theories
along this latter vein are discussed in the following section.
75 The United States Constitution, art. I, s. 8, cl. 8.
14   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
opment of American intellectual property theory, was also a strong advocate for
this incentive-based argument, arguing “the patent monopoly was not designed to
secure the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, and
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”76 Similarly, within the Canadian cop-
yright context, commentators have noted the importance of copyright in ensuring
ample production of quality intellectual works.77
(A) Copyright as Contract
The concept of copyright as a manifest “bargain” between the author and the
public domain has roots in the early establishment of patent law, where the agree-
ment reached between inventor and the state resembled that of a contract.78 In ex-
change for the introduction of a new product, machine, or trade, the state guaran-
teed the artisan or designer protection from competitors.79 In this respect, copyright
served as a “trading company” of sorts, exchanging intellectual production for
commercial and academic monopolies. This perspective is difficult to maintain in
the modern scheme of intellectual property, where the negotiation and occasional
revocation of conditions is governed by statute. Perhaps most notably stated by
Estey J in Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.80
Copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is
statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor
falls in between rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common
law. Copyright legislation creates rights and obligations upon the terms and
in the circumstances set out in the statute. . . . It does not assist the interpre-
tative analysis to import tort concepts. The legislation speaks for itself and
76 William H. Francis & Robert C. Collins, Cases and Materials on Patent Law: Includ-
ing Trade Secrets, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub.
Co, 1981) at 92–94.
77 Burshtein, supra note 19 at 394. Also noteworthy are Burshtein’s observations with
respect to the impact that production levels will have on the content (and consequential
use) of the Internet. Citing the U.S. Government’s Report on the Internet:
All the computers, telephones, scanners, printers, switches, routers,
wires, cables, networks and satellites in the world will not create a
successful [Internet], if there is no content. What will drive the [In-
ternet] is the content moving through it. (U.S. White House Informa-
tion Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Executive Summary 6 (Washington, D.C.,
1995), [“White House Report”].
78 Vaver, supra note 62 at 12.
79 Ibid. at 12.
80 Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 249
(S.C.C.).
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the actions of the appellant must be measured according to the terms of the
statute.81
Thus, while the contract model of copyright is no longer a strongly advocated
position, it is demonstrative of the incentive-based principles that form the founda-
tion for most instrumentalist models. Guaranteed protections for authors and cre-
ators against “saucy intruders”82 continue to serve as incentives for creation,
whether this be by reason of contract or statute.83
(ii) Social Utility
Central to this perspective is the viewing of intellectual production as integral
to society’s “scientific and cultural progress.”84 As noted by Robinson:
The granting of a patent privilege at once accomplishes three important ob-
jects; it rewards the inventor for [her/]his skill and labor; it stimulates
[her/]him, as well as others, to still further efforts in the same or different
fields; it secures to the public an immediate knowledge of the character and
scope of the invention. Each of these objects, with its consequences, is a
public good, and tends directly to the advancement of the useful arts and
sciences.85
As noted in Robinson’s comment, the notion of “social good” is integral to utilita-
rian justifications of copyright laws. Coined in the work of Jeremy Bentham, the
utilitarian school of thought evaluates policies, actions, or laws based on conse-
quences.86 Having already determined intellectual production to be of social value,
utilitarians view actions and/or laws, which result in increased intellectual produc-
tion, to be justifiable. In this respect, utilitarian theories of copyright law are more
closely connected to the “incentive” doctrine than any other instrumentalist philos-
81 Ibid. at 261.
82 A reference to Livingston J’s judgement in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175 (N.Y.
Sup.Ct., 1805), at 181 [Pierson].
83 For a thorough discussion of how this notion of a natural rights-based claim to copy-
right can be limited within a public (instrumentalist) domain via the idea-expression
dichotomy, see Abraham Drassinower, “A rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy in Copyright Law” (2003) 16:1 Cdn. J. L.& Juris 3; See also Abraham
Drassinower, “Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First Possession” (2006) 54
Cleve. St. L. Rev. 191.
84 Edwin C. Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property” in Adam Moore, ed., Intellectual
Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Lit-
tlefield, 1997).
85 William C. Robinson, Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions (Boston, MA: Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., 1890) at s. 33. Although Robinson speaks exclusively of patent law,
the same observations are arguably transferable to the copyright regime.
86 J.J.C. Smart, “Utilitarianism” in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(New York, NY: MacMillan, 1967) at 208.
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ophy, and are also the most prevalent in contemporary discussions of information
technology. As noted in the 1995 U.S. Report on the Internet:
By granting authors exclusive rights, the public receives the benefit of liter-
ary, artistic, musical, and dramatic works that might not otherwise be cre-
ated or disseminated. Effective copyright protection promotes a
cybermarketplace of ideas, expression and products.87
These views often go so far as to suggest that “without the copyright, patent,
and trade secret property protections, adequate incentives for the creation of a so-
cially optimal output of intellectual products would not exist.”88 Yet, cautions have
been given, even among utilitarian theorists themselves, about the dangers associ-
ated with grounding rights exclusively in social utility. As noted by Waldron:
It seems psychologically unavoidable that rights grounded in utility will be
taken as ends in themselves: too much emphasis on the utilitarian character
of the premises can undermine people’s sense that it is a right (as opposed,
say, to some defeasible presumption or rule of thumb) that is grounded in
this way.89
The result is an attempt among utilitarian theories to incorporate a notion of “eq-
uity” into discussions of social good, i.e. it is only fair/equitable that investors in
intellectual property be given some return on their investment.90 On pure instru-
mentalist grounds, these justifications would be difficult to uphold. Similarly, when
the effect of globalization on notions of “social good” is considered, these original
conceptions of “social utility” are questionable, particularly in the face of develop-
ing countries, world poverty, and human rights violations.91 Also, one of the more
common knee-jerk reactions to utilitarian theories of copyright is the suggestion
that many intellectual labourers would continue to produce intellectual works in the
absence of property rights and/or other monetary incentives. The centuries before
the creation of copyright and patent laws were far from barren of inventive and
creative work.92 Furthermore, “authors in ancient times, as well as monks and
scholars in the middle ages, wrote and were paid for their writings without copy-
right protection.”93
Although a complete analysis of these criticisms and their effect on the valid-
ity of utilitarian theories is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is useful to con-
87 “White House Report”, supra note 77 at 394.
88 Hettinger, supra note 84 at 30.
89 Waldron, supra note 74 at 851.
90 See Waldron’s discussion of publisher’s rights, where he contends arguments of this
nature are valid only on grounds of market efficiency, rather than those of fairness or
desert, supra note 74 at 853-5.
91 See Marci A. Hamilton, “The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overpro-
tective” in Moore, supra note 84 at 243.
92 Vaver, supra note 62 at 7.
93 Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs” (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 at 282.
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sider alternative contentions in light of the prominence given to arguments of social
utility within the context of the new information age.
(A) Intrinsic Value
Arguments asserting the existence of an inherently valuable relationship, wor-
thy of recognition, between creator and created are among the oldest justifications
for copyright and find root in eminent theories of real property.94 The most promi-
nent class of these theories is explored here. A second justification for copyright
based on intrinsic values is elaborated on in Part IV with the delineation of my own
theory of copyright, where I investigate Hegel’s suggestion that the appropriation
of property is necessary for the development of personality.95
(iii) Labour-Desert
Proprietary claims have long been recognized as particularly strong when they
are characterized as being derivative, in some fashion, of the “person.”96 Many
commentators have suggested that although in the absence of further argument, this
claim should not carry independent moral weight, social practice has demonstrated
a tendency to allot such claims a normative status.97 This is attributed to the histori-
cal prevalence of two inter-related theories of labour and desert, founded on the
ideas of John Locke, who held that any person ought to be entitled to the “fruits of
her/his labour.”98 The basis for this right has three inter-related origins.99 Although
this section will discuss each in turn, elaboration on these points is made in Part IV.
(A) Excellence
Labour-desert theorists contend that intellectual works are of such a degree of
accomplishment that they justify public response.100 As noted by Becker, “Some
intellectual labour exemplifies human excellence. It exceeds ordinary human
achievement — perhaps by being exceedingly original, or difficult, or brave, or
beautiful.”101 As a result of these extraordinary achievements, intellectual
labourers gain the admiration of society, which in turn should be expressed by way
94 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed. (London, UK: U of Cam-
bridge Press, 1967).
95 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Univ. Press, 1952).
96 Lawrence C. Becker, “Deserving to Own Intellectual Property” (1993) 68 Chicago-
Kent L. Rev. 609 at 619.
97 Becker, ibid.
98 Locke, supra note 94.
99 These categories are taken from Becker, supra note 96, although they appear frequently
in the literature.
100 Becker, supra note 96 at 621.
101 Ibid.
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of an award of value and/or worth.102 Although articulations of this argument fre-
quently resemble the “incentive” principle, it is important not to equate what
Becker terms “admiration” with the utilitarian notion of a social good. Although
supporters of the labour-desert theory would likely not oppose the suggestion that
society is enriched by the presence of works of excellence, proprietary rights in
these works are not granted, according to the desert theorist, either as a result of
this enrichment or for the purposes of encoring more. Rather, the sole justification
for intellectual property rights is desert, irrespective of the impact upon society or
intellectual production.103
(B) Exchange
Another aspect of the labour-desert argument is based on a notion of exchange
or “reciprocal benefits.”104 The roots of this contention stem from both the work of
John Locke and Karl Marx, and base desert arguments on the value of the product
rather than the producer. While Lockean theories of labour recognize the creation
of value in work, which, at times,105 will warrant property rights, Marx considered
the impact of the political economy on this value to suggest its transformation into
“exchange” value.106 This aspect of the labour-desert theory is frequently cited as
its most problematic, given the exclusionary and limited nature of property rights as
well as the complications that arise out of collaborative labour.107 The result has
been the adoption of a series of “qualifiers” for the types of labour that would be
viewed as deserving of right. Stated succinctly by Becker:
A person who produces a public benefit, by way of morally permissible (but
not required) actions, deserves to receive a fitting and proportional benefit
from the public for doing so. Similarly, if a person’s unrequired actions pro-
duce a public burden, that person deserves to bear a fitting and proportional
burden for doing so.108
(C) Need
The last aspect of the labour-desert theory suggests that intellectual labourers
may develop a sense of identity as a result of their labour, which is intricately con-
102 Ibid. at 621-622.
103 Becker notes the possibility to recognize excellence in ways other than the granting of
ownership/exclusionary rights. He suggests medals of honour, public expression, au-
thor-identification as some possible examples. See Becker, ibid. at 622-623.
104 Ibid. at 623.
105 Ibid.
106 Ken Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought
(London, UK: Sage, 1995) at 65.
107 See e.g., Timothy Brennan’s discussion of the rightful copyright owner (under the la-
bour-desert theory) to his article, supra note 68 at 692.
108 Becker, supra note 96 at 624-625.
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nected with the product of that labour.109 In elaboration of this point, Becker sug-
gests a series of common metaphors, including, “that people internalize, incorpo-
rate, or become personally invested in things; that a thing can become an extension
of one’s personality; that one can project oneself into a thing.”110 Although further
elaboration of this point is made in Part IV when Hegel’s theory of property and
personality are explored, an important component to the notion of “need” in labour-
desert arguments is a social one. Becker suggests that where a labourer’s personal
need has been “generated and sustained by social norms, and if one’s meeting that
personal need requires the help of additional social norms, then either (i) the help
should be given, or (ii) the need-sustaining norms should be changed.”111
While acknowledging the contestable nature of this latter suggestion, Becker’s
recommendation reveals the conventional conflict at work in copyright theory, i.e.
consideration of the collective whilst determining the rights of the individual. The
following section explores three other problematic aspects to copyright law that
have emerged with the greatest resonance in recent years in the wake of the infor-
mation highway. While these are distinctive characteristics of the IP-IT debate, it is
important to recall that they occur against this consistent backdrop of contradiction
between access and exclusion inherent in copyright law.
III. NEEDLES IN A CYBERSTACK: IDENTIFYING THE
  PROBLEM
Some theorists have suggested that real property enjoys a presumption of ex-
clusivity, personality, and autonomy that intellectual property does not.112 As Ste-
phen Carter notes:
Our legal theory is premised on the instrumental conception of property
rights, but our conversational habits are not. In ordinary conversation, we
indulge an instinct that property rights are like other aspects of autonomy —
vital, personal, irreducible. That individualistic, almost libertarian, vision
motivates both anti-tax agitation and pro-productive choice fervor: What’s
mine is mine and the state can’t take it away.113
Instead, justifications for copyright are often “hijacked by utilitarianism,”114 focus-
ing on arguments of social utility and access to information. While Carter suggests
this is due to the intimate relationship intellectual property shares with incentive
structures, and the “uniqueness” of intellectual property versus real property,115 I
109 Ibid. at 626.
110 Ibid. at 626, n. 44.
111 Ibid. at 627.
112 Stephen L. Carter, “Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?” (1993)
68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 715.
113 Ibid. at 717.
114 Waldron, supra note 74 at 858.
115 Carter, supra note 112 at 717.
20   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
suggest it is because recent developments in the dissemination of intellectual
works, as well as the ways in which their accompanying property rights have been
conceptualized, have resulted in the removal of the “person” from copyright. While
Part IV below will argue for a theory of copyright law that reincorporates the no-
tion of personhood, this section outlines three of the contributing factors to the
“faceless” state of copyright in the technological era. These are: (i) the emergence
of a corporate intermediary; (ii) the “death” of authorship; and (iii) the lack of con-
sideration of the copier.
(a) Corporate Intermediary
One of the more prominent aspects of the Napster case was the emergence of
discussion about the level of exclusion and/or restriction copyright law imposed on
information rightfully thought to be “free.”116 Interestingly, the issue was rarely
framed as one of conflict between author and copier, i.e. artist and Napster user, but
rather one of tension between the recording industry and the general public.117
Similarly, artists who chose to voice opinions in support of the RIAA lawsuit were
often cautious, or at least cognisant, of the “commercial” advocacy it could be said
to endorse. As noted by one recording artist:
Everyone I know is excited about all the possibilities the Internet has to
offer. As a musician, the Internet has made it possible for me to share my
music with people that could have never been reached by conventional
methods. It has been taboo for artists to speak out concerning the business
side of their music. The fear has been that the buying public, as well as
other artists, would perceive this concern as greed, and that the artists’ sole
purpose for creating was the money. This perception has silenced many art-
ists concerning MP3 and Napster. The silence must end. As a child I created
music to express my inner thoughts and feelings, and that purity has stayed
with me throughout. The day I decided to share my music with the world,
was the day I decided to walk the fine line between art and commerce. I
have been blessed in that I do what I love and can support my family with
what I create. When my music is given away, as taboo as it is for me to say,
it is stealing. I need not defend my motives for making music, but the distri-
bution of my music has made me business conscious. I have decided to sell
my music to anyone who wants it, that is how I feed my family, just like a
doctor, lawyer, judge, or teacher. Not to insult anyone’s intelligence, but my
music is like my home. Napster is sneaking in the back door and robbing me
blind.118
116 Barlow, supra note 23.
117 One common exception to this was the financial “backlash” some highly successful
(and vocal) bands/artists experienced, (e.g. Metallica), who were frequently criticized
as being “anti-Napster” for reasons of financial greed. For images and commentary, see
e.g., Camp Chaos Entertainment, online: Camp Chaos
<http://www.campchaos.com/blog-archives/old_cartoons/napster_bad/>.
118 Scott Stapp, recording artist for band “Creed” (RIAA website, supra note 1).
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The presence of a corporate intermediary between the public (and its would-
be-copiers) and the intellectual labourer was made particularly known in two dis-
tinct ways. The first of these was the creation of the “big bad record company”
image, frequently used by both artists and users to justify copyright infringement.
As noted by recording artist Chuck D. of the group Public Enemy, “the record com-
panies have been getting away with murder for 12 years, since the advent of the
CD, when they could manufacture something for 69 cents and sell it for $10.98
wholesale.”119Similarly, this vein of argument was employed by Napster in its le-
gal defence documents, where views from artists in support of Napster were solic-
ited, often resulting in anti-industry responses. Excerpts from the affidavit of re-
cording artist Steven Wendell Isaacs, filed in support of Napster during the A&M
Records law suit, demonstrate this point:
Based on my experience in the music and entertainment industry, I believe
Napster is a powerful promotional tool for the many artists and bands that
want to reach a large number of listeners but have not been able to get, or
have been disappointed by, the support provided by large recording labels.
. . . Considering what we, and hundreds of other bands, have been through
with the antiquated business model of the major label, a program like Nap-
ster is a positive and powerful service for artists like Skycycle. Napster puts
the power back into the hands of the artist and listener. Taking Napster
away from Skycycle will have a negative impact on the band’s ability to
reach out to, and create new, fans.120
The emergence of this negative image of the recording industry121 can also be
found within the academic literature, where independent labels and online distribu-
tion methods are heralded as being more fair to artists than traditional record con-
119 Jonathan Vankin, “Downloading the Future: The MP3 Revolution — the End of the
Industry as We Know It” L.A. Weekly (26 March 1999) at 36, cited in Berchadsky,
supra note 5 at 786.
120 Declaration for Steven Wendell Isaacs in Support of Defendant Napster’s Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (26 July 2000), Case Nos. C 99-5183
and C 00-0074 MHP (ADR), FindLaw, online: FindLaw
<http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/napster/napster/dec_wendell.pdf>.
121 Important to note is the existence of many artists’ views which directly oppose this
negative image of the industry. As noted by recording artist Don Henley:
The Internet is both a democratizing force and a force for undermining
democracy. The concept that music should be free is some holdover
from the Sixties, I guess. And I resent it when people imply that this is
not a legitimate profession, that what I do for a living should be given
away. Napster and MP3.com try to make people believe that they are
some sort of Robin Hood organization, stealing from the record com-
panies and giving music to the people. But they are stealing from the
people who create that music.
Don Henley, Rolling Stone Magazine, (22 June 2000).
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tracts.122 A second indicator of an intermediating force at work in the IP-IT debate
is the apparent stark dichotomy between copyright law and the ethics of its viola-
tors. A U.S. Internet user study reported in 2000 indicates that over half (53 per
cent) of Internet users surveyed do not believe the downloading of copyrighted mu-
sic amounts to theft.123
Further evidence of the recording industry serving as an intermediary between
author and copier is found in the measures used to determine the damage of online
copyright infringement. Although some recording artists have spoken out about the
intrinsic value of the work, much of the discussion surrounding issues of infringe-
ment deals directly with the recording industry’s financial gains and losses with
respect to MP3’s.124 In some cases, this has been attributed to a “chasm between
morality in general and selfishness in particular,” and the ease with which copy-
right infringement can be committed, a rationale frequently cited among advocates
of increased security technologies.125 As noted by one commentator, “the vast ma-
jority of internet users not only recognizes the copyright rationale but, in many
cases, even has an interest in co-operating to preserve those rights; and see the
master him[sic]self. . . .”126
Yet, neither the actions of Internet users during the Napster hearings, nor in
the wake of its demise would seem to support this theory.127
In both cases, technology and its users are undermining traditional institu-
tions, while asserting a populist sense of what is ethical that may well clash
Interestingly, Henley relies upon the personal value of his labour to support
his claim.
122 See Ryan S. Henriquez, “Facing the Music On the Internet: Identifying Divergent
Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distri-
bution” (1999) UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 57. See pages 111-118, in particular, for a discus-
sion of the typical record contract provisions which financially prejudice artists.
123 Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, Downloading Free Music: Internet Music Lovers
Don’t Think it’s Stealing (28 September 2000), online: PEW Internet & American Life
Project <http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdf/PIP_Online_Music_Report2.pdf>,
cited in Bergen, supra note 12 at 261.
124 This was even present in the legal evidence tendered by the parties in the case, where
arguments about the financial impact of Napster and its online services were made on
both sides. See Berschadsky, supra note 5 at 770.
125 Wiese, supra note 33 at 393. Other commentators have noted both the detachment and
anonymity associated with online copyright infringement, suggesting this might also be
a causative factor in the dichotomy between law and ethics, or law and practice. See
Henriquez, supra note 122 at 65–68.
126 D. Downing, “The Beat Goes On: Music Copyright and the Internet” (1999) 86 M.I.P.
3, cited in Wiese, supra note 33 at n. 57.
127 This is evidenced even by the millions of users who visited the Napster website to
download last-minute MP3’s during the temporary stay on its injunction. Amy Harmon
notes: “Despite a clear statement by Judge Patel that Napster was likely to be found
guilty of contributing to copyright infringement, millions of individuals swarmed to
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with what is legal. That has raised questions that go well beyond the out-
come of the court battles.128
Although seemingly a new entity, this corporate intermediary is merely
emerging from a fairly constant, albeit shadowed, venue in copyright history. The
first copyright statute, the English Statute of Anne,129 which created the notion of
“authorship,” was arguably a codification of the long-standing practices of the Sta-
tioners’ Company, a central group of booksellers in London.130 Although “copy-
right” was established as a right of action belonging to the “proprietors” of intellec-
tual works, the publishers were expectant (reasonably) that they would assume this
role.131 As noted by Mark Rose, “copyright had traditionally been a publisher’s not
an author’s right.”132 Perhaps ingeniously, reform movements for new legislation
resulted in the British Copyright Act of 1814, wherein authors and their literary
rights received statutory recognition, while publishers were able to mask the pursuit
of their own interests under the guise of those of authors.133 As Jaszi observes:
[I]t is clear that the booksellers’ short-term goals were well served by the
choice. In fact, no other strategy would have allowed them to apply as much
rhetorical leverage to back up their novel project of obtaining control over
literary texts through the elaboration of portable legal rights as “things.”134
Consider, as well, the comment made by Alvin Kernan (as noted by Jaszi):
Why copyright ended up in the hands of writers instead of publishers is
suggested by the petition of a group of booksellers recorded in the Journal
of the House of Commons (26 Feb. 1706, o.s.) when the matter was being
considered; it read in part: “[m]any learned Men have spend [sic] much
Time, and been at great Charges, in composing Books, who used to dispose
of their Copies upon valuable Considerations, to be printed by the Publish-
ers . . . but of late Years such Properties have been much invaded, by other
Persons printing the same Books. . . .” It seems a likely inference that while
download music from the service, or learn about alternative services that provide the
means to swap music files.” Amy Harmon, “Online Davids vs. Corporate Goliaths”
New York Times (6 August 2000), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/library/review/
080600napster-review.html>. (Last accessed September 14, 2008).
128 See also Alex Colangelo, “Copyright Infringement in the Internet Era: The Challenge
of MP3s” (2001) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 891; Alejandro Zentner, “Measuring the Effect of
File Sharing on Music Purchases” (2006) 49 J. Law & Econ. 63; Sudip Bhattacharjee,
et al., “Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of
Music Industry Legal Actions” (2006) 49 J. Law & Econ. 91.
129 Copyright Act, 1709 8 Anne, c. 21.
130 Jaszi, supra note 61 at 468.
131 Ibid.
132 Mark Rose, “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Beckett and the Geneology of
Modern Authorship” (1988) 23 Representations 51 at 54.
133 Jaszi, supra note 61 at n. 48.
134 Jaszi, supra note 61 at 469.
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it was the booksellers who were pushing the issues, they were using the
author’s rights as a blind for their own interests. No one, however, seems to
have recognised the radical change of ownership from printer to writer that
had occurred in the statute, and after its passage all went on, as they had
before, selling and purchasing what the booksellers and authors still as-
sumed to be perpetual rights in books old and new.135
Noteworthy are the arguments among some legal commentators that while
copyright is often justified in terms of the “incentive” principle, it often serves to
promote the commercial distribution of intellectual works more than their creation,
suggesting that the contemporary IP-IT crisis may well be a continuation of au-
thors’ rights being used to serve the interests of corporate intermediaries.136
The changes alluded to by Kernan, at the end of the above excerpt, are ex-
panded on in the following section, where the evolution of authorship is discussed,
describing the brief recession of the perceived presence of publishers’ pseudo-
rights and interests.
(b) Death of Authorship
One of the earliest statements of “authorship” as containing an entitlement to
one’s intellectual works comparable to contemporary copyright framework is found
among the works of Milton. Upon learning that King Charles had appropriated a
prayer from Sidney’s Arcadia on the eve of his execution, Milton voiced two ob-
jections, the first religious, and the second resembling copyright:
But leaving aside what might be justly offensive to God, it was a trespass
also more than usual against human right, which commands that every au-
thor should have the property of his own work reserved to him after death,
as well as living. Many princes have been rigorous in laying taxes on their
subjects by the head, but of any king heretofore that made a levy upon their
art and seized it as his own legitimate, I have not whom beside to
instance.137
In spite of the presence of such views, Rose suggests the modern day proprie-
tary author did not surface until the middle of the following century when a market
capable of sustaining intellectual production existed.138
All of these cultural developments — the emergence of the mass market for
books, the valorization of original genius, and the development of the Lock-
ean discourse of possessive individualism — occurred in the same period as
the long legal and commercial struggle over copyright. Indeed, it was in the
course of that struggle under the particular pressures of the requirements of
135 Alvin Kernan, Printing Technology, Letters, & Samuel Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Univ.
Press, 1987) at 99-100, cited in Jaszi, supra note 61 at n. 45.
136 See Arnold Plant, The New Commerce in Ideas and Intellectual Property (London,
UK: Athlone Press, 1953).
137 John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. by Merritt Y. Hughes (New York,
NY: Odyssey Press, 1957) at 794, cited in Rose, supra note 132 at 55.
138 Ibid. at 55-56.
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 legal argumentation that the blending of the Lockean discourse and the aes-
thetic discourse of originality occurred and the modern representation of the
author as proprietor was formed. Putting it baldly, and exaggerating for the
sake of clarity, it might be said that the London booksellers invented the
modern proprietary author, constructing him[sic] as a weapon in their strug-
gle with the booksellers of the provinces.139
Emphasis on the author’s proprietary rights issued from Lockean theories of
real property, where it was suggested that the works of one’s mind were certainly
“fruits” worthy of entitlement.140 This inalienable quality to intellectual property
could be transferred to booksellers upon purchase of the copyright, thereby perpet-
uating publishers’ control over the market of intellectual works.141 In this respect,
although the corporate intermediaries of intellectual property became primary
rights holders in the proprietary forum, they were secondary characters in the pub-
lic one, allowing for literary focus to shift to the author.142
This discovered focus on “authorship,” had a substantial impact on literary
theory, which had previously occupied itself with analyses of the text and its effect
on the audience rather than the author.143 Robert Rotstein argues the contemporary
view within copyright theory of text as “self-contained, autonomous ‘work’ that
has one valid meaning independent of how an audience approaches it” is an “aber-
ration” in literary history.144 Rather, literary critics from as early as Plato and Aris-
totle through the Renaissance, viewed the text “as a force acting upon the world,
not as an object to be deciphered.”145 The advent of copyright and its commercial
market brought with it the commodification of text, and subsequently, author,
marking a departure from notions of “text” and an adoption of objectified
“works.”146
The “death” of authorship was a consequence of both this process of com-
modification and its treatment by post-structuralist thinkers, who began to question
the meanings assigned to works via the market.147 Pioneered by the work of Jac-
ques Derrida, the “deconstruction” of text served to establish meaning through its
139 Rose, supra note 132 at 56. Rose does note, in the following paragraph, that it was
actually the Statute of Anne that introduced the proprietary author; however, earlier
commentary in this discussion suggests this statutory reform might well have been the
work of the booksellers as well; See, supra note 124 and corresponding text.
140 Rose, supra note 132 at 58.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Robert H. Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 725 at 730-731.
144 Ibid. at 730.
145 Ibid. at 731.
146 Ibid. at 799.
147 Ibid. at 736.
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 reader and her context, shifting with each new reader or context.148 As Roland
Barthes suggests in his now famous 1967 essay, “to give a text an Author is to
impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writ-
ing.”149 The result is an effective obliteration of the author.
The author . . . conveniently erases [him/her]self in deference to the Reader,
who is thereby freed to take [her/]his pleasure with the text. ‘[T]he birth of
the reader . . . must be ransomed by the death of the author.’150
Together, the emergence of the corporate intermediary and the post-modernist
death of authorship have resulted in the abandonment of the “person” in copyright
theory. This seems particularly prominent in the technological environment where
detachment from the creator of the work is inflated and corporate rights-holders
appear unsympathetic and impervious to minor infringements. As noted by Amy
Harmon, following a survey of the comments posted on the Gnutella (a decentral-
ized Napster copy-cat) mailing list after Napster’s shut-down,
Few of the Napster refugees flooding the Gnutella mailing list with set-up
questions last week seemed terribly concerned about the outcome of the San
Francisco case. “Can someone please inform me on how to start everything
up,” read one typical post by a new user, “I wanna get to mp3’s.”151
(c) Non-Consideration of Copier
The tendency within intellectual property is to think about the law and its pur-
poses in terms of the author; however, the role of the copier seems a necessary
(albeit overlooked) component to this consideration. As Jeremy Waldron writes:
If we think of an author as having a natural right to profit from [her/]his
work, then we will think of the copier as some sort of thief; whereas if we
think of the author as beneficiary of a statutory monopoly, it may be easier
to see the copier as an embodiment of free enterprise values.152
148 Ibid. at 737, n. 56, Rotstein elaborates by suggesting that,
deconstruction is a continuous mode of play with the text by the
reader, and it major aim is to destroy the illusory notion of a fixed
textual meaning. Every meaning which is presumed to stand by the
commentator is shown to be no more than a play between simulation
and dissimulation. The true nature of every text therefore is to be in a
state of flux as long as it is engaged by the reader and is reduced to a
mere trace when the engagement is over because the text has no deter-
minate essence.
149 R. Barthes, “The Death of the Author” (1967) 5/6 Aspen reprinted in D. Finkelstein and
A. McCleery, eds., The Book History Reader (New York: Routledge, 2002) at 223.
150 Michael Hancher, “Dead Letters: Wills and Poems” in Sanford Levinson and Steven
Mailloux, eds., Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern Univ. Press, 1988) at 103, commenting on Roland Barthes.
151 Harmon, supra note 127.
152 Waldron, supra note 74 at 842.
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This perspective highlights the correlative nature of property law. Property rights
have long been recognized as encompassing a wide array of entitlements. “Legal
‘property’ is not a clod of earth but a bundle of legal entitlements.”153 As noted
above by Waldron, it seems essential when engaged in the acts of bestowing rights,
recognizing those rights, and then enforcing those rights, that the role of both par-
ties to any transaction play a vital role in theoretical justifications of those entitle-
ments. Property law has been viewed as involving three particular rights; (1) the
right to use, (2) the right to exclude, and (3) the power to transfer these rights.154
The suggestion that a conferral of a right necessarily involves the imposition
of a duty is, by no means, a “new” theory. Aristotle’s notion of corrective justice
suggested that a kind of equilibrium existed between two equal parties in terms of
the plaintiff’s rights and the defendant’s duty.155 He contended that once this equi-
librium had been disrupted, the law’s purpose was to restore this balance. The same
conception of duality was prominent in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who de-
scribed justice as being unlike any of the other moral virtues in that it involved a
relation to the “other.”156 He argued that each of the three components of justice;
equality, rectification, and action necessitated a consideration of the correlative na-
ture of rights and duties. Writing, “justice by its name implies equality,”157 Aqui-
nas suggested that the concept of law-breaking was inextricably tied to a principle
of an equilibrium, where justice is concerned with the gains and losses of legal
persons and the restoration of equal standing.
Other contemporary theorists have argued that a normative understanding of
“gain” and “loss” is necessary for a level of cohesion between the material
losses/gains of a wrongful act and the “rights-based” analogies instrumental to cor-
rective justice. One such theory has been put forth by Prof. E. J. Weinrib, in terms
of tort law, in his article, “The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice.”158 Therein,
he suggests a defendant’s wrong is not just the breach of a norm, but the focus for
any given remedy. Corrective justice requires a reason for considering certain acts
wrongful or in need of correction. This reason must be something that can be ap-
plied equally to each party (because of the correlativity requirement in corrective
justice, and in Aristotle’s equilibrium analysis). Similarly, the reason must be appli-
cable to each party with simultaneity. There cannot be two separate reasons applied
153 William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge,
Mass: Harv. Univ. Press, 1995) at 2.
154 Ibid.
155 Aristotle, “Book V” in Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by James Welldon (London: Mac-
Millan, 1930).
156 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York, NY: Benziger Bros, 1947), II-II, q.
58, a. 2 at 1435-6 and a. 4 at 1437.
157 Ibid. at II-II, q. 58, a. 2, at 1436.
158 E. J. Weinrib, “The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice,” (1994) 44 Duke L.J. 277.
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to each party. The reason for conceptualizing the plaintiff’s rights must be the same
reason for rationalizing the defendant’s duty.
In terms of intellectual property, given this correlativity requirement, any jus-
tification of copyright must necessarily speak to both the author’s right to deny and
the copier’s duty not to copy. Jeremy Waldron observes:
Intellectual property rights are rewards or incentives, and they serve the ex-
cellent purpose of encouraging authors. But the rewards here are not just
medals or Nobel prizes; the incentives we dole out amount literally to re-
strictions on others’ freedom that may be exploited for authors’ benefits. It
sounds a lot less pleasant if, instead of saying we are rewarding authors, we
turn the matter around and say we are imposing duties, restricting freedom,
and inflicting burdens on certain individuals for the sake of the greater so-
cial good. In moral philosophy, where suspicion of utilitarian arguments is
rampant, that rings alarm bells. To say that rights are a means to an end is
one thing; but the correlative proposition that some should be forced to bear
sacrifices for the greater social good smacks dangerously of throwing Chris-
tians to the lions for the delectation of Roman society.159
This illustrates the need to consider the would-be-copier in any justification of cop-
yright. The following section attempts to do this by elaborating on Margaret Jane
Radin’s theory of property as personhood and the influence of Hegel’s theory of
free will and his conception of “wrong.”
IV. WHOSE “RIGHT”? — A PERSONHOOD THEORY OF
  COPYRIGHT
(a) Context
One of the central functions of property rights is the exclusion of others from
one’s personal domain, be that land or intellectual works. The definition of pro-
perty in Black’s Law Dictionary emphasises this element, defining property as
“that which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to
one.”160 As stated by Wesley Hohfeld, the first characteristic of property is that the
owner has “legal rights, or claims that others . . . shall not enter on the land, that
they shall not cause physical harm to the land, etc. . . .”161In this way, property
rights help to establish the boundaries of the individual.162
The notion of bodily integrity and personal freedom has been linked to pro-
perty law for centuries. Early market societies of feudal Europe conceptualized the
159 Waldron, supra note 74 at 862.
160 Henry Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co.,
1990) at 1216.
161 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710 at 746.
162 Alexandra Wald, “What’s Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of Rape” (1997)
30 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 459 at 466.
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person on the basis of what s/he owned,163 and as the free market economy devel-
oped, “freedom became a function of possessions.”164 C.B. MacPherson expands
on this view, stating:
The individual in market society is human in [her/]his capacity as proprietor
of [her/]his own person; [her/]his humanity does depend on [her/]his free-
dom from any but self-interested contractual relations with others; [her/]his
society does consist of a series of market relations.165
As noted previously, these views of property and bodily autonomy were foun-
dational in the work of John Locke, where he argued that “every man[sic] has a
property in [her/]his own person: this no body has any Right to but Himself [sic].
The labour of [her/]his body, and the work of [her/]his hands, we may say, are
properly [her/]his.”166 This view was later taken up by intellectual property theo-
rists suggesting that one’s thoughts and feelings are inherently one’s own, and that
the placing of these on paper or in design or on canvas, (as examples) is a sufficient
basis to warrant property rights against the rest of the world. The argument is one
that “if we have rights to control anything, it is the contents of our minds.”167
This theory, however, was seemingly undermined with the 1805 case of
Pierson v. Post,168 where proprietary rights were held to follow from possession,
rather than labour. That is, property was not justified for labour’s sake alone, but
rather for what the nature of labour identified about it. This idea was also addressed
by Karl Marx, who argued that it was when social relations were dominated by a
system of exchange that individuals confronted each other as buyers and sellers,
leaving individuals with narrow, shrunken individualities.169 Strands of this theory
can be found in many contemporary labour scholars, including David Beatty. In his
article, “Labour is Not a Commodity”,170 he suggests the understanding of labour
and the labour market as commodities (and consequently, sources of property) ig-
nores the deeper value that work has for individuals. “Work” in the modern world
has come to be closely connected to some deeper, personal life meaning and is no
163 Note that the masculine pronoun is being employed here in recognition of the historical
fact that women were not seen as capable of appropriating property, and consequently
of being “persons.”
164 Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy (Univ. Park, PA: Penn. State Univ. Press,
1991) at 31, cited in Wald, supra note 162 at 469.
165 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) at 272.
166 Locke, supra note 94 at 19, s. 27.
167 Hettinger, supra note 84 at 78.
168 Pierson, supra note 82.
169 Morrison, supra note 106 at 75.
170 David Beatty, “Labour is Not a Commodity” in Barry Reiter & John Swan, eds., Stud-
ies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 314.
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longer a means of subsistence.171Similar to this, Paul Weiler, in his book, Gov-
erning the Workplace,172 examines the ways in which the market for the human
labour differs from markets for other services and/or commodities. Although very
pragmatic in its approach, the impact of Weiler’s discussion is the recognition of
the ways in which human labour is treated differently and functions differently than
other commodities in a free market world, largely because of its intricate connec-
tion to notions of autonomy.
(b) Property as Personhood
The work of Margaret Jane Radin argues that property ownership plays a fun-
damental role in exercises of self-realization and autonomy.173 Given that the fun-
damental characteristic of property is the exercise of control over things and to the
exclusion of others, property ownership, by its very nature, implies a relationship
between subject and object. The treatment of the object as such, necessarily identi-
fies the other as subject.174
Given this understanding, the correlativity of property rights implies that
something else is occurring at the moment of possession, which implies the grant-
ing of property rights. Take the case of Pierson, for example. Pierson’s act of seiz-
ing the fox and mortally wounding it, served to appropriate it (the fox) for his (Pier-
son’s) use. This serves to both exclude Post (and the rest of the world) from the use
of the fox. Perhaps a Lockean theory of property would suggest that if the decision
is correct, it is the labour expended by Pierson in this appropriation, which warrants
the property right. However, Radin’s notions of personhood suggest something
else. In order to have exclusive possession of the fox, Pierson must declare his
domination and use of the object to Post, thus identifying himself as a non-object
and establishing his own personhood. “To achieve proper self-development — to
be a person, an individual needs some control over resources in the external envi-
ronment. The necessary assurances of control take the form of property
rights.”175Granting the notion that intellectual property is property, the same analy-
sis would hold true for copyright and the establishment of personhood via a legal
entitlement to publish and exclude others from copying.176
171 Ibid.
172 Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) at
136–52.
173 M. J. Radin, “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford L. Rev. 957.
174 This idea has been employed by feminist scholars to suggest that the practice of prohib-
iting women’s status as property owners served to classify them as objects. Catherine
MacKinnon writes, “[W]omen have not authored objectifications, we have been them.
Women have been the nature, the matter, the acted upon . . .”, Catherine MacKinnon,
“Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory” (1982) 7 Signs
514 at 544.
175 Radin, supra note 173 at 960.
176 For some discussion on the relationship between intellectual property and property, see
Carter, supra note 112.
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At this stage, three important points need to be addressed. The first is a point
Radin herself addresses in response to challenges that her theory is not unlike theo-
ries of property based on intrinsic values of autonomy or liberty.177 Radin suggests
that these theories view certain external objects as necessary to one’s freedom in
the world, i.e. in their absence, a person’s liberty or autonomy might be
threatened.178 While this is a worthy philosophy, Radin suggests it fails to convey
an adequate “connection with the external world.”179 While the demands for per-
sonal autonomy in utilitarian or libertarian theories (e.g. freedom from interference;
control of one’s environment; attributed responsibilities) represent aspects of what
is constitutive of “personhood,” they fail to capture the relationship external objects
can have with the self.180 In this respect, Hegel’s theory of abstract right is particu-
larly useful. As Radin notes:
[T]he notion that the will is embodied in things suggests that the entity we
know as a person cannot come to exist without both differentiating itself
from the physical environment and yet maintaining relationships with por-
tions of that environment.181
This raises the second important point of Radin’s argument, i.e. the differentiation
between property that is constitutive of the person and that which is not. Radin
terms property that is linked to personhood, “personal” and describes as follows:
When an item of property is involved with self-constitution in this way, it is
no longer wholly “outside” the self, in the world separate from the person;
but neither is it wholly “inside” the self, indistinguishable from the attrib-
utes of the person. Thus certain categories of property can bridge the gap, or
blur the boundary, between the self and the world, between what is inside
and what is outside, between what is subject and what is object.182
Radin terms property that is not of this nature, “fungible,” much of which
might be owned for useful or pleasurable purposes (e.g. money); however, they are
not inherent to one’s person.183 “Since fungible property is not connected with the
self in a constitutive way, but is only held instrumentally, nothing is problematic in
trading it off for some other item that the person would rather have.”184Radin sug-
gests that obsessions with fungible property (e.g. fetishism, materialism) already
177 Radin, supra 173 at 960.
178 Ibid. at 960.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid. at 977.
182 M. J. Radin, “The Colin Ruagh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering
Personhood” (1995) 74 Oregon L. Rev. 423 at 426.
183 Ibid. at 426.
184 Radin, supra note 182 at 427.
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suggest the existence of “personhood” property; however, these need to be distin-
guished from the property she is attempting to advocate. She suggests:
We can tell the difference between personal property and fetishism the same
way we can tell the difference between a healthy person and a sick person,
or between a sane person and an insane person. In fact, the concepts of san-
ity and personhood are intertwined: At some point we question whether the
insane person is a person at all. . . . Judgements of insanity or fetishism are
both made on the basis of the minimum indicia it takes to recognize an indi-
vidual as one of us.185
Setting aside the various difficulties in this particular argument and Radin’s
attempt to establish a sense of collective objectivity through use of language, it is
important to note that the distinction between personal and fungible property, for
Radin, is made on the basis of consensus. This raises the third and final matter of
concern that needs to be addressed before the application of this theory to copyright
can be explored, and Hegel’s theory of abstract right can prove to be most useful.
What is the lack of consensus on this issue in terms of personhood? How does the
lack of reciprocal acknowledgement, in terms of an external connection to property,
affect personhood? Radin states:
To refuse on moral grounds to call fetishist property personal is not to re-
fuse to call it property at all. The immediate consequence of denying per-
sonal status to something is merely to treat that thing as fungible property,
and hence to deny only those claims that might rely on a preferred status of
personal property.186
While not explicitly stated by Radin, I would suggest the result is a disjuncture in
one’s conception of self, an argument that will become clearer after a review of
Hegel’s theory of abstract right.
(c) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
(i) Freedom and Will
Hegel’s discussion of right is fundamentally linked to both the notion of free-
dom and its precursor, the will. As stated succinctly by Radin, “Hegel’s property
theory is an occupancy theory; the owner’s will must be present in the object.”187
For Hegel, rights are constituted by and for freedom. It is both the “substance of
right and its goal.”188 The mind (and its work) is where this liberty finds its founda-
tion. Human thought is freedom manifest, the homeland of the “will” — the mak-
ing of the mind explicit in the external world. Hegel draws upon the distinction
between humans and animals to expound on this concept. Although the animal may
act within the world, this act is without will.189 It hunts, it seeks, eats, reacts, and
185 Radin, supra note 173 at 969-970.
186 Ibid. at 960.
187 Ibid. at 973.
188 Hegel, supra note 95, at 20, s. 4.
189 Ibid. at 227, [A] s. 4.
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lives according to instinct. The object of its pursuit is not brought to mind in a self-
conscious fashion. This clear dichotomy between thought and action is not present,
according to Hegel, within the human mind. Thought is action; in thinking, a per-
son makes the world her own. In willing, one extracts from the particular circum-
stances of the external world, the complications of nature and social arrangement. I
want the thing desired, but do I deserve it? Do I have access to it? Do I have the
resources to acquire it? Is the object limited? Will I have to compete to acquire it?
These particularities (and others) interfere with any absolute freedom the human
actor might have in the external world, but within the mind, the act of willing is an
extraction from the particular: “[t]his is the unrestricted infinity of absolute abstrac-
tion or universality, the pure thought of oneself.”190
There is a certain degree of freedom in this abstraction, in the work of the
mind to abandon the particular and its restraints. There is an element of inviolabil-
ity of the person in this notion. The will, at least in the mind’s internal sense, can-
not be altered by the external. The body is merely a shell for the self that lays
within it, the untouchable freedom of the will. “In chains I may be free.”191 Hegel
warns, however, that this freedom is a “negative” freedom because it can never be
actualized, since in actualization, the particular is formed, and it is only in the de-
struction of the particular that this negative will feels its existence.192 “Conse-
quently, what negative freedom intends to will can never be anything in itself but
an abstract idea, and giving effect to this idea can only be the fury of destruc-
tion.”193 Thus, in order to be free, the will must incorporate the particular; it must
be a willing of something, rather than just willing in the abstact. Here, one of the
first steps of Hegel’s dialectic comes to the fore. An initial level of freedom exists
in thought and in the mind’s ability to abstract from all particularities, and yet, this
freedom remains incomplete without the incorporation of the particular. While this
particular will necessarily oppose the sweeping abstraction of the will, it is in the
reconciliation of these two elements that the will is made manifest.194 The particu-
lar is necessary to the attainment of a complete and free will; to be “free” the will
must be a willing of something.195 As a means of explicating this point, Hegel
employs the example of the man on the street who believes himself to be free be-
190 Ibid. at 21, s. 5.
191 Ibid. at s. 48.
192 Ibid. at 22, s. 5.
193 Ibid.
194 This is sometimes referred to as the “synthesis” of the “thesis” and “anti-thesis” of the
components of abstract right. This is somewhat of a misrepresentation of Hegelian
thought, however, given that these terms do not appear in any of Hegel’s writings, but
rather only in the work of subsequent scholars (and interpreters.) See Gustav E. Muel-
ler, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis, Anti-Thesis, and Synthesis’” (1958) 19:3 Journal of
History of Ideas 411.
195 Hegel, supra note 95 at 228, [A] s. 6.
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cause it is open to him to act in any way he pleases.196 Yet, Hegel points out that it
is the very arbitrariness of the man’s choice that indicates his lack of freedom.
Arbitrariness implies that the content is made mine not by the nature of my
will but by chance. Thus I am dependent on this content, and this is the
contradiction lying in arbitrariness. . . . If you stop at the consideration that,
having an arbitrary will, a man can will this or that, then of course his free-
dom consists in that ability. But if you keep firmly in view that the content
of his willing is a given one, then he is determined thereby and in that re-
spect at all events is free no longer.197
Therefore, in order to obtain autonomy, the will must will something external
and particular. “A will which . . . wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing
and is therefore no will at all.”198 Returning to the infamous case of Pierson,199 we
see Post’s “will” to capture the fox, and Pierson’s act of doing so. It is only the
latter that serves to manifest Pierson’s freedom to the world.
It is in this way that Hegel refers to the will made manifest as personality.200
Hegel states, “freedom is to will something determinate, yet in this determinacy to
be by oneself and to revert once more to the universal.”201 Through desire, I recon-
cile my abstract will with the particular restraints and contexts of the external
world, and in so doing, come to know and recognize myself as a person in that
world. I am determined by, through, and in the particular, whilst gaining a con-
sciousness of myself as self-relational, universal, abstract, and free.
It is the reciprocity of this recognition — my abstract will seen in the particu-
lar; the particular forming part of my will’s determination — that forms the basis of
Hegel’s concept of abstract right. The self-relational aspect of personality allows
for a recognition of oneself as free and untouchable. Yet, this personality cannot
fully move within the world without encountering and needing others. The self-
recognizing component of abstract right is, like that of the undetermined will, a
negative freedom. Acting as a person within the world requires the creation of a
more tangible category of right, (e.g. property ownership, bodily integrity). For
Hegel,
[a] person must translate [her/]his freedom into an external sphere in order
to exist as Idea. Personality is the first, still wholly abstract, determination
of the absolute and infinite will...The rationale of property is to be found not
in the satisfaction of needs but in the suppression of the pure subjectivity of
personality. In [her/]his property, a person exists for the first time as reason.
Even if my freedom is here realized first of all in an external thing, and so
196 Ibid. at 230, [A] s. 15.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid. at 228, [A] s. 6.
199 Pierson, supra note 82.
200 Hegel, supra note 95 at 37, s. 35.
201 Ibid. at 229, [A] s. 7.
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falsely realized, nevertheless abstract personality in its immediacy can have
no other embodiment save one characterized by immediacy.202
Property and personal rights are manifestations of a reciprocal recognition that
occurs between personalities. I am granted the right to own property by others who
see me as a property owner and who I, in turn, recognize as persons able to grant
me this right. The nature of personality involves a respect for the untouchability of
others. The requirement that a person be viewed as free and sacred by others, cre-
ates the implicit assumption that it is how others must also be viewed.
(ii) Freedom and Wrong
It is the reciprocal recognition of each other’s “personality” that forms the
foundation of Hegel’s analysis of “wrong.” For Hegel, no form of wrong is possible
without a prior establishment of recognized right. “[T]here is crime only insofar as
I am recognized as an individual, and my will is taken as universal counting in
itself. Prior to recognition, there is no insult, no injury.”203 In the most general
sense, there are two forms of wrong that Hegel’s work accounts for, (i) innocent
and (ii) malicious. The innocent wrong is one that occurs where each of two parties
has grounds for title in the same thing. Only one of them is right and, therefore, the
injury is merely in the wrong person having possession of the thing. Hegel argues
that this is an “innocent” wrong, given that the recognition of each party’s capacity
for ownership is preserved. Corrective justice can be applied to remedy this error;
the mistaken possession can be redistributed, the loss duly compensated. Hegel’s
malicious wrong, however, requires something further. It varies from the innocent
wrong in that the act of the criminal or wrong doer not only violates the rights of
the other party, but in so doing, transgresses the notion of right itself. “[I]t leaves
the victim with neither substance nor even the semblance of right.”204 The mali-
cious wrong fails to recognize the other’s “personality.” Thus, this form of wrong is
self-contradictory in that the criminal’s act is an act of freedom, an expression of
her free will, yet, it serves to nullify the very same freedom in others. Her exercise
of force is both an expression and destruction of will, and thus, when taken ab-
stractly, is a wrong.205
Wrong in the full sense of the word is crime, where there is not respect
either for the principle of rightness or for what seems right to me, where,
then, both sides, the objective and the subjective, are infringed.206
202 Ibid. at s. 41 and Addition.
203 Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of Spirit, (1805-6) cited and trans. by Leo Rauch, (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1983) at 125.
204 Robert R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 1997) at 153.
205 Hegel, supra note 95 at 67, s. 92.
206 Ibid. at 245, [A] s. 90.
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Hegel describes this criminal act as an act of coercion that serves to negate the
universal free will. The criminal’s act appears, on the surface, to be an act of free-
dom, an expression of her free will; however, the freedom this act delivers is in-
complete in its self-contradiction. The criminal’s act serves to deny the other ex-
actly of what has allowed her to act and, in so doing, has removed the possibility
for recognition and thus, for right. Hegel notes, “there is crime only insofar as I am
recognized as an individual, and my will is taken as universal, counting in itself.
Prior to recognition, there is no insult, no injury.”207 The criminal’s act of infring-
ing the other’s personality has served to negate her own.
In this respect, the freedom in the wrong is, once again, what Hegel refers to
as a “negative freedom.” The only means of correcting this wrong is through its
own negation. For Hegel, this negation takes place in the form of a second act of
coercion, manifested through punishment. The wrongdoer’s rights are violated (e.g.
imprisonment, death) as a response to the violation her act was to another’s person-
ality. Hegel warns against considering this punishment as merely punitive, noting
“that crime is to be annulled, not because it is the producing of an evil, but because
it is an infringement of the right as right.”208 Instead, the punishment is restorative;
the criminal’s act is honoured as the act of a rational and autonomous being.
The injury [penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly
just — as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom,
his right; on the contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal
himself, i.e. in his objectively embodied will, in his action. The reason for
this is his action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is
something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law
which he has explicitly recognized in his action and under which in conse-
quence he should be brought as under his right.209
As such, punishment serves to negate the criminal’s original negation of right and
re-establish the value and autonomy of free will.
Personality requires that each person recognize the free will of others as sacro-
sanct. Such a system would be inoperable if certain members were exempt from
this simply because the exercise of their free will occurred in a manner incompati-
ble with others. What value would the free will have if the criminal’s choice could
be merely discarded as incoherent or irrational? Therefore, Hegel argues that the
punishing of the criminal as a rational being is not an exaltation of her violation of
another’s right; rather, it is the celebration of the free will in each person. It is a
recognition and respect for the autonomy of each actor. As noted by Williams:
Wrong clarifies the substantial nature of right. It shows that right is more
than a contract; it is more than an artificial, posited universal that is subject
in principle to revocation by the arbitrary subjective will of individuals.
207 Ibid. at 125.
208 Hegel, supra note 95 at s. 99.
209 Ibid. at s. 100.
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Rather right is the basic requirement and fundamental condition of a com-
munity of freedom.210
(iii) Application to Copyright
Radin’s theory of personhood functions along a continuum, which she terms
the “personhood dichotomy.”211 It suggests that where fungible property rights can
be overruled in some instances, personal rights cannot. She notes:
This is to argue not that fungible property rights are unrelated to per-
sonhood, but simply that distinctions are sometimes warranted depending
upon the character or strength of the connection. Thus, the personhood per-
spective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely connected
with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.212
As discussed earlier, Hegel’s formulation of the will suggests that its embodi-
ment in the expressed or external will is the manifestation of personality or “per-
sonhood.” Hegel suggests that proprietary rights are intrinsically related to the de-
velopment of freedom:
The capacity for rights here signifies that the free individual is a ‘person’
insofar as he[sic] has the right of disposition over objects of the will, and,
with this power of disposition, stands in rightful relation to other free indi-
viduals as a person.213
Furthermore, intellectual property rights, for Hegel, are a means by which au-
thors, inventors, designers, artists, and the like, distinguish themselves from that
which they have created. Radin also suggests, that in terms of “personal” property,
making the leap from real property as personhood to intellectual property as per-
sonhood rather straightforward (particularly given Hegel’s emphasis on the will as
work of the mind).214 However, the categorization of intellectual property as “per-
sonal” property raises the concern partially addressed above in the discussion of
Radin’s theory. What is the consequence of a lack of consensus on this
classification?
Similar to Radin’s refusal to grant “personal” property status to fungible ob-
jects without adequate consensus, Hegel’s theory emphasizes the need among per-
sons for recognition by others. Most importantly, this recognition is a “self” recog-
nition in that a person’s will is manifested in objects so as to show a person’s
concurrent connectedness and detachment from that object. Therefore, in copyright,
the author needs the copier to be an equally autonomous being. For Hegel, this is
210 Williams, supra note 204 at 155.
211 Radin, supra note 173 at 986.
212 Ibid. at 986.
213 Joachim Ritter, “Person and Property: On Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Paragraphs 34-
81 (1961)” in Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982) at 124.
214 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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not possible if the copier chooses to violate the rights of the author, for in so doing,
she acts to undermine and negate her own personality. In violating the rights of
another subject, the copier reduces that subject to object, thereby enjoining the pos-
sibility of “self” recognition of her own person. The duty of the copier is grounded
in her own autonomy, where she is bound to respect the rights of the author in order
to afford herself her own rights and distinction as a “subject” rather than an object.
In this respect, a theory of copyright that is based on personhood responds to
many problematic factors associated with the digital era. Through a positing of the
creator’s rights as central to the debate, the corporate intermediary can be both left
to hold and enforce copyrights, and yet by-passed for the purposes of justification.
Similarly, while authorship is “revived,” it is not done so at the expense of com-
modifying the intellectual labour of the author. Rather, the manifestations of will
embodied in intellectual works are methods by which other subjects are recognized
as such. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the role of the would-be-copier is
made central, suggesting a form of self-regulation whereby the infringement of an-
other’s personal rights results in the negation of one’s own self.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE PERSONS IN CYBERSPACE?
Bill C-61 died on the table when a federal election was called in early Septem-
ber 2008; however, its resurrection appears imminent with promises of copyright
reform in four of the five political party election platforms released during the fall
2008 campaign.215 Of these, only the Bloc Québecois couched these legislative
intentions within the context of the “IP-IT” crisis, suggesting that Internet users
215 The Conservative Party of Canada has promised to “reintroduce federal copyright leg-
islation that strikes the appropriate balance among the rights of musicians, artists, pro-
grammers and other creators . . . but also protects consumers who want to access copy-
right works for their personal use,” The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper’s
Plan for Canadians (Conservative Party of Canada, Ottawa: 2008) at 14. The NDP
platform suggests that the Party will “[e]ensure that new copyright reform legislation
fairly addresses compensation for artistic creators and includes proper input from all
affected stakeholders including: arts/artist groups, educators, software innovators, con-
sumer groups and ordinary Canadians,” Platform 2008 (New Democratic Party of Can-
ada, Ottawa: 2008) at 37. The Green Party promises to “[p]rotect the copyright for
artists such that they are not surrendered to museums and galleries in the process of
permitting exhibits,” Vision Green (Green Party of Canada, Ottawa: 2008) at 94. The
Liberal Party of Canada did not include copyright issues in its 2008 election platform.
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were currently the only beneficiaries of the fruits of authors’ labours.216 Evidence,
of the now familiar pendulum, swings between a heavily regulated, protective cop-
yright scheme on one hand, and its complete overhaul on the other, and continues
to dominate discussions of copyright reformation. This article has examined these
conventional responses, identifying the competing interests at work in both tradi-
tional copyright schemes and contemporary internet-based criticisms, in order to
suggest that a copyright law capable of both surviving and thriving in an advanced
technological era must resituate itself within a new frame, one emerging from the
perspective of the would-be copier. Without this paradigm shift, copyright schemes
grounded in instrumentalist values will do little to address the problems that tech-
nology and its (post)modernizing implications have presented for copyright theory,
namely the emergence of a corporate intermediary and the subsequent over-
shadowing (if not complete elimination) of the author and artist. Instead, copyright
regimes are posited as enterprises in “balance” between the competing interests of
consumers and industry. The “person” (and her “right”) are lost in such
configurations.
Using the work of Margaret Jane Radin on property as personhood and
G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of abstract right, I have argued that an effective copyright
scheme for the 21st century is not one focused on competing interests, but rather,
one based on principles of correlativity, reciprocity, and freedom. The positioning
of copyright as a personal right embodies the individual’s ability to stand amidst
other free individuals and stake claims. Yet, to impose duties under a rights
scheme, without contemplation of their corresponding entitlements, is to undermine
the possibility for subjects to recognize themselves within the scheme itself. In-
stead, the subject is made object of the law; she does not see herself within it, is not
seen by others, and thus, is not capable of substantively holding rights nor of fulfil-
ling their corresponding duties. This reduces the law’s perceived, and arguably, ac-
tual legitimacy, as well as the will and rationale for recognizing other rights hold-
216 See Présent! pour le Québec: Plateforme électorale (Bloc Québecois, PQ: 2008) at 58-
59. In this document (only available in French), Bill C-61 is addressed directly:
La Loi sur le droit d’auteur ne tient pas compte de l’impact des
nouvelles technoPlateforme Électorale Élections 2008 logies, notam-
ment l’arrivée de l’Internet, et doit être modifiée le plus rapidement
possible. Tout travail méritant salaire, il faut que les créateurs puissent
recevoir leur dû tout en s’assurant que les consommateurs bénéficient
de cette nouvelle source d’accès à la création. À l’heure actuelle, le
téléchargement illégal sert mal les artistes qui ne reçoivent rien de
leurs créations, alors que les fournisseurs de service Internet sont les
seuls à recevoir le fruit du travail des autres. Le projet de loi C-61,
déposé en juin 2008 par les conservateurs, ne responsabilise nullement
l’industrie et se limite à s’attaquer aux consommateurs qui paient
pourtant celle-ci pour leur accès à Internet. Le Bloc Québécois
s’assurera que la nouvelle Loi sur le droit d’auteur sera équitable et ne
désavantagera ni les créateurs ni les consommateurs (58-59).
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ers.217 According to Hegel, this results in a “negative” freedom and one that cannot
sustain rights protection. The copier downloads music neither because it’s easy nor
because it’s there, but because it belongs to no one. The copier is not “seen,” and
thus, cannot “see.”
The concrete changes, which could be expected as a consequence of adopting
a “personhood” theory of copyright law, are difficult to predict, particularly with
respect to intellectual works that are more aligned with a “sweat of the brow” doc-
trine than others.218 Perhaps one of the more important implications of the theory
would be the alignment of intellectual property rights with real property rights. Re-
cent trends, particularly with the adoption of utilitarian philosophies, have resulted
in a detachment of intellectual property from the realm of real property. Many have
argued that this direction has served to remove the notion of “right” from copy-
right.219 A theory of personhood might be more apt at demonstrating the likeness
between the two realms of property law, and the ability of each to assign entitle-
ments in pursuit of the establishment and proclamation of individual autonomy.
The practice of relying solely on arguments of social benefit and public policy to
justify the conferral of rights seems even more problematic given the particular
demands of the new information age.
Certainly, one of the more difficult challenges facing a copyright theory of
personhood is that of implementation. However, copyright has withstood signifi-
cant challenges since its inception: the development of the printing press, enabling
mass production and dissemination of intellectual work; the emergence of a market
economy of intellectual production; the development of broadcasting, computer
programs, and software; and the information highway, with its seemingly limitless
routes and hazards.220 And while I assign the details of a cohesive “personhood”
enforcement plan to future discussions and scholars, I do not doubt its possibilities.
As noted by M. de Zwart, “Copyright has adapted in the past; it will again.”221
217 This notion is a central principle of Hobbesian philosophies of law. As Hobbes identi-
fies in Law 10 of his text, Leviathan: “That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no
man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be re-
served to every one of the rest,” Hobbes, Leviathan, in C.B. Macpherson ed., (London:
Penguin Classics, 1986; original publication date, (1651)) at chap. 15, 210–212. See
also D. Dyzenhaus, “Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law” (2001) 20 Law and Philoso-
phy 461.
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